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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 Before us is the certified question of whether the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act are applicable to the denial of a promotional 
opportunity based upon age to an individual working in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in the employ of a United States 
subsidiary controlled by a foreign parent corporation not itself 
controlled by an American corporation, where the promotional 
opportunity is a position with the foreign corporation outside 
the United States.  Because we do not believe Congress intended 
the ADEA should be applied extraterritorially under the facts 
here, we will affirm the judgment of the district court.  
 
 I. 
 The relevant facts on summary judgment are not 
disputed.  In 1984, Garland Denty was hired by Smith Kline 
French, a Pennsylvania corporation, as Director of Quality 
Assurance.  Denty held this job until January 1989, when he was 





Services, International.  Denty held these positions at Smith 
Kline's Philadelphia office.  Smith Kline subsequently merged 
with the Beecham Group plc, a British corporation in 1989; the 
resulting corporation, SmithKline Beecham plc (SB plc), is 
incorporated and headquartered in the United Kingdom.  Denty 
continued working for SmithKline Beecham Corporation (SBC), the 
wholly-owned American subsidiary of SB plc.   
 As a consequence of the merger, five new positions were 
created with SB plc in foreign locations.  Denty alleges that in 
1990, he was told he would be promoted to one of these positions. 
 Yet, he was subsequently denied the promotion allegedly because 
of his age which, at that time, was fifty-two.  Denty further 
contends that these positions were filled with men younger than 
he.  The promotion decisions were made by SB plc executives in 
England while Denty worked for SBC in Philadelphia. 
 On December 27, 1993, Denty instituted the present 
action against SBC,
1
 alleging violations of the ADEA and PHRA for 
failure to promote, deprivation of employment opportunities, and 
age discrimination.  Thereafter, SBC filed a motion for summary 
judgment, arguing inter alia that the ADEA did not apply to 
Denty's failure-to-promote claim.  The district court granted 
summary judgment for SBC on the failure-to-promote claim.  In so 
doing, the district court found that the statutory language of 
                     
1.  The district court considered whether SBC was the proper 
defendant.  The court resolved the issue by ruling that it would 
allow Denty leave to amend his complaint to name SB plc as a 
defendant if it did not rule against him on SBC's summary 
judgment motion.  Denty v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 907 F.Supp. 





the ADEA, and by extension the PHRA, did not provide for 
extraterritorial application of the Act against a foreign 
corporation for failure to promote to positions outside of the 
United States.  The court specifically ruled that "[t]he relevant 
work site is the location of [the position for which the 
plaintiff applied], not the location of Denty's employment at the 
time of the alleged discrimination."  Denty v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., 907 F.Supp. 879, 884 (E.D. Pa. 1995).  The court further 
opined that there was no distinction in the ADEA between a 
"failure to hire" case, in which the discrimination occurs in the 
country where the job site is located, and a "failure to promote" 
situation.  Id.  Finally, the district court rejected Denty's 
contention that SBC and SB plc were indistinguishable and should 
be considered as a "single employer," holding instead that the 
proper inquiry was "whether Denty sought employment with an 
employer `controlled' by an American firm."  Id. at 885.         
   Denty then moved for certification to allow an 
immediate appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which the 
district court granted on May 10, 1996.  The question certified 
for appeal is: 
whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and 
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act are 
applicable to the denial of a promotional 
opportunity based upon age to an individual 
working in Philadelphia, PA, in the employ of 
a foreign corporation not controlled by an 
American corporation, where the promotional 
opportunity is a position with that same 







Denty petitioned for permission to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b) from a certified interlocutory order of the district 
court.  We granted Denty's motion on June 21, 1996.   
 We review the district court's grant of summary 
judgment de novo.  Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1294-95 (3d Cir. 
1996).   
 
 II. 
 We begin our analysis with the longstanding principle 
of American law that "legislation of Congress, unless a contrary 
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States."   EEOC v. Arabian American 
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).  The Supreme Court stated that 
in applying this rule, courts should determine if the "language 
in the [relevant Act] gives any indication of a congressional 
purpose to extend its coverage beyond places over which the 
United States has sovereignty or has some measure of legislative 
control."  Id. (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 
281, 285 (1949)).  If Congress wishes to go beyond the purely 
domestic realm, there must be an "affirmative intention . . . 
clearly expressed."  Id. (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera 
Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957).   We turn, therefore, 
to the plain language of the ADEA.   
 Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), the ADEA states in 
pertinent part:    
It shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual 
or otherwise discriminate against any 





terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's 
age[] . . . . 
 
Prior to 1984, the ADEA did not contain any provision addressing 
extraterritorial reach.  Instead, the ADEA adopted language from 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(d) and (e), which 
provided that no "employee whose services during the workweek are 
performed in a workplace within a foreign country" was protected. 
 Consequently, we held in Cleary v. United States, 728 F.2d 607, 
610 (3d Cir. 1984), that the ADEA could not be applied to 
Americans employed outside the United States by American 
employers.   
 In 1984, Congress responded to Cleary and subsequent 
cases
2
 by amending the ADEA to provide for limited 
extraterritorial application.  First, Congress amended the 
definition of "employee" to include "any individual who is a 
citizen of the United States employed by an employer in a 
workplace in a foreign country."  29 U.S.C. § 630(f).  Second, 
Congress enacted the key provision in this case, 29 U.S.C. § 
623(h)
3
, which states: 
Practices of foreign corporations controlled by 
American employers; foreign persons not 
                     
2.  See, e.g., Lopez v. Pan Am World Services, Inc., 813 F.2d 
1118 (11th Cir. 1987); S.F. DeYoreo v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 
Inc., 785 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1986); Ralis v. RFE/RL, Inc., 770 
F.2d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 
F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1985); Zahourek v. Arthur Young and Co., 750 
F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1984); Thomas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 745 F.2d 
279 (4th Cir. 1984). 
3.  This subsection was originally codified as 29 U.S.C. § 
623(g), creating the incongruity of two subsection "g's."  This 





controlled by American employers; factors 
determining control 
 
 (1)  If an employer controls a corporation 
whose place of incorporation is in a foreign 
country, any practice by such corporation 
prohibited under this section shall be 
presumed to be such practice by such 
employer. 
 
 (2)  The prohibitions of this section shall 
not apply where the employer is a foreign 
person
4
 not controlled by an American 
employer.   
 
 (3)  For the purpose of this subsection the 
determination of whether an employer controls 
a corporation shall be based upon the-- 
 (A)  interrelation of operations, 
 (B)  common management, 
 (C)  centralized control of labor       
relations, and 
 (D)  common ownership or financial     
                control,   
 
of the employer and the corporation. 
 
As the Supreme Court noted in Arabian, "[t]he expressed purpose 
of these changes was to `mak[e] provisions of the Act apply to 
citizens of the United States employed in foreign countries by 
U.S. corporations or their subsidiaries.'"  499 U.S. at 259 
(quoting S. Rep. No. 98-467, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984  
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2974, 2975).     
 Viewing the 1984 amendments together, the district 
court here concluded that the "ADEA applies abroad only when (1) 
the employee is an American citizen and (2) the employer is 
controlled by an American employer."  907 F.Supp. at 883.  Our 
                     
4.  "The term `person' means one or more individuals, 
partnerships, associations, labor organizations, corporations, 
business trusts, legal representatives, or any organized group of 





reading of the plain language of the statute compels us to agree. 
5
 The legislative history likewise necessitates this conclusion: 
  
The purpose behind the amendment is to insure that the 
citizens of the United States who are 
employed in a foreign workplace by U.S. 
corporations or their subsidiaries enjoy the 
protections of the [ADEA].  When considering 
this amendment, the Committee was cognizant 
of the well-established principle of 
sovereignty, that no nation has the right to 
impose its labor standards on another 
country.  That is why the amendment is 
carefully worded to apply only to citizens of 
the United States who are working for U.S. 
corporations or their subsidiaries.  It does 
not apply to foreign nationals working for 
such corporations in a foreign workplace and 
it does not apply to foreign companies which 
are not controlled by U.S. firms.  Moreover, 
it is the intent of the Committee that this 
amendment not be enforced where compliance 
with its prohibitions would place a U.S. 
company or its subsidiary in violation of the 
laws of the host country.
6
 
                     
5.   As the district court noted, the employment decisions 
at issue involved Denty's application for positions in the United 
Kingdom and Australia.  The relevant work site for ADEA purposes, 
therefore, is the location of these positions.  We find support 
for this conclusion in the fact that the language of the ADEA 
does not distinguish between failure to hire and failure to 
promote situations.  Accordingly, we find Lopez v. Pan Am World 
Servs., Inc., 813 F.2d 1118 (11th Cir. 1987), indistinguishable 
from the case before us.  Nor does the Tenth Circuit's decision 
in Zahourek v. Arthur Young and Co., 750 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 
1984), inform our decision here.  There, the court of appeals 
held that the ADEA did "not apply to the termination of 
employment of an American citizen by an American employer where, 
as here, the `workplace' is Honduras."  Id. at 828-29 (footnote 
omitted).  The 1984 amendment to the ADEA, without reference to 
where the discriminatory effect occurred, now specifically 
protects a person in Zahourek's position:  an American citizen 
working for an American company abroad.  Indeed, the focus of the 
amendment is now upon the degree of control exercised by an 
American company over the conduct of the discriminating 
corporation.  
6.  The Committee codified their intent at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f), 







S. Rep. No. 98-467, at 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3000-
01.  We emphasize that the job for which Denty applied is in the 
United Kingdom with the parent company, not in the United States 
with the subsidiary. 
 The EEOC guidelines, promulgated in response to the 
1984 amendments, do not convince us otherwise.  The guidelines 
provide that "the ADEA does not apply to foreign firms operating 
outside the United States, unless those firms are controlled by 
U.S. employers.  On the other hand, the ADEA does apply to 
foreign firms operating on U.S. soil."  EEOC Policy Guidance, N-
915.039, Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 5183, 6531 (March 3, 1989).  
Here the record is clear that Denty is currently employed by a 
U.S. subsidiary of a British parent corporation.  SB plc controls 
the American subsidiary, not the other way around.  Clearly, 
then, the ADEA cannot be applied extraterritorially to create 
liability on the part of SB plc given the facts of this case. 
 We reject the EEOC's argument that by failing to apply 
the ADEA extraterritorially here, Denty will fall into a "black 
hole."  To the contrary, Denty does not fall into a "black hole"-
(..continued) 
It shall not be unlawful for an employer . . . to take 
any action otherwise prohibited under 
subsection[] (a) . . . where such practices 
involve an employee in a workplace in a 
foreign country, and compliance with such 
subsection[] would cause such employer, or a 
corporation controlled by such employer, to 
violate the laws of the country in which such 
workplace is located[.]   
 






-he is protected by British law.  The fact that British law does 
not protect individuals forty years of age or older from 
discrimination is not our concern.  Moreover, Congress considered 
the possibility of a "black hole" and yet chose not to extend the 
ADEA, recognizing the well-established principle of sovereignty. 
 The EEOC's argument, thus, misses the mark. 
 The language of section 623(h)(2) could not be more 
clear--the ADEA does not apply when a foreign corporation 
controls an American corporation and the employment is with the 
foreign parent abroad.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment 




          
 
 
                     
7.  Denty's failure-to-promote claim under the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act (PHRA) must likewise be dismissed as no evidence 
exists to show the Pennsylvania legislature intended to apply the 
PHRA to employment decisions made by foreign corporations for 
positions located outside the United States. 
